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From Complex Organizations with Simple Jobs 
to Simple Organizations with Complex Jobs
L. Ulbo de Sitter,1 J. Friso den Hertog,2 and Ben Dankbaar1’3
Organization redesign has become widely accepted as a regular task for 
m anagem ent, recently invigorated by the in terest in Business Process 
Reengineering. In spite of that, it is still a neglected area in organization science. 
This paper emphasizes the importance of design theoiy and design-oriented 
research. The potential role of design theory is exemplified by the description 
of Integral Organizational Renewal (IOR), a design theory grounded in practical 
experience in the Netherlands. This approach can be viewed as a Dutch variant 
of Sociotechnical Systems Design. The essence of this approach lies in the 
transform ation of complex organizations offering simple jobs into simple 
organizations offering complex jobs. IOR can both be regarded as an expert 
approach and as a route for self-design, The approach enables the members of 
the organization to develop and use their own design expertise, IOR is therefore 
not only a strategy for organization design, but for organization development 
as well. The paper points to opportunities to make organization research more 
relevant to organization practice.
KEY WORDS: organization design; systems theory; sociotechnical systems 
design; participation.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the links between organization science and 
organization design. It explains a specific design theory that fits into a 
broader European tradition of organization redesign. This theory is a Dutch 
variant of sociotechnical systems design, referred to here as: Integral Organi- 
zation Renewal (IOR). IOR theory has emerged during the last 20 years from 
intensive cooperation between consultants, organization researchers, profes­
sionals, and managers in industry and services. The main objective of IOR
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has been to develop a systematic approach to design which supports improve­
ments in both the quality of work and what is called “the quality of the or­
ganization” (i.e., its ability to deal with a complex and continuously changing 
environment). Meanwhile, the theory has been applied by dozens of Dutch 
firms and is taught in more than ten institutions of higher education. Its de­
velopment can be regarded as a continuous iteration between theory and 
practice and has resulted in a coherent set of design principles, design rules, 
and design sequences. As such, IOR can be regarded as a “grounded theoiy” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), i.e., a theory using abstract concepts to describe 
and analyze a series of general phenomena, but based on practical experi­
ences. As will be shown, IOR is based on a critical reception of the classical 
approach in sociotechnical systems design (cf. van Eijnatten, 1993). After a 
brief description of the basic principles of IOR, both from a design and from 
a development perspective, this paper offers some reflections on the impli­
cations for the development of organization science.
TWO OPTIONS FOR COPING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT
Organizations which are confronted with increasing uncertainty and 
complexity have to invest in organizational redesign in order to survive. 
They are facing a choice between two basic options (cf. Galbraith, 1974). 
The first option is to restore the fit with the external complexity by an 
increasing internal complexity. New organizational functions are created in 
this strategy to react adequately on the external developments (see Appen­
dix A). This usually means the creation of more staff functions or the en­
largement of staff-functions and/or the investment in vertical information 
systems. Staff is needed in this option in order to coordinate the actual 
work process which remains organized on Ihylorist principles. One might 
call this the strategy of “complex organizations and simple jobs.”
In the second option, by contrast, the organization tries to deal with the 
external complexity by reducing the internal control and coordination needs. 
This is done by the creation of self-containing units and lateral groups (Gal­
braith, 1974). An essential condition for this approach is that the (primary) 
work process itself is fundamentally tackled, by changing fragmented direct 
tasks in meaningful larger tasks and by re-integrating “thinking and doing” or 
“indirect” and “direct” tasks. This option might be called the strategy of “sim­
ple organizations and complex jobs.” The option results in: less support (in­
direct) staff, less bureaucracy, and better jobs on the shop floor or office floor.
The development of the classical Sociotechnical Systems Design 
(STSD) Theoiy (Emeiy, 1959; Emery & Txist, 1960; Emery & Thorsrucl, 
1969; van Eijnatten, 1993) has been an important step in the development 
of organizational design theory along these lines. It has made clear that
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there exists an alternative for the process of continuously ongoing bureau­
cratization. Furthermore, the classical STSD theory has offered a systems 
framework with a high validity in the practice of organizational design on 
the shop floor level However, there has been also a lot of criticism re­
garding the classical STSD approach. Pava (1986) states in this respect that 
STSD is ready itself for redesign, because in his perception there has been 
hardly any progress in the development of concepts and instruments and 
a stagnation in empirical field research. The classical STSD did not get 
beyond standard solutions like the semi-autonomous group and standard 
instruments, like the nine-step model and the variance matrix. Scandinavian 
writers (S0rensen, 1985; Gustavsen, 1992; Gustavsen & Engelstad, 1985) 
point to the lack of diffusion of STSD. In their view, the sociotechnical 
approach has been too strongly dominated by expert knowledge which is 
introduced from outside the organization. Because of this overdependency 
on external experts and external ideas, projects did not become self-pro­
pelling, nor did they work out as “self-selling” examples of best practice. 
Gustavsen and Engelstad (1985) therefore argue in favor of a process-ori- 
ented rather than a structure-oriented approach: the development of demo­
cratic dialogues in which members develop their own local theory,
The Dutch approach has developed in close interaction with debate 
and practice in Scandinavia. This has resulted in the adoption of a partici­
pative approach of design as outlined below. The Dutch approach, however, 
has also retained a strong expert component, which has particularly profit­
ted from the work of Swedish practitioners in the Swedish automobile in­
dustry.
THE STSD TRADITION IN EUROPE
There exists a long tradition of work design and organization design in 
Europe, particularly in Northern and Western Europe. Tb a large extent, this 
tradition dates back to the 1960s, a period of enormous industrial growth 
accompanied by a rapid increase in the average training and education level 
of employees. This caused a gap between the capabilities and ambitions of 
workers on the one hand, and the monotonous and degraded work in mass 
manufacturing on the other. This gap became visible in high levels of per­
sonnel turnover and absenteeism, as well as in the decreasing quality of prod­
ucts and services (den Hertog, 1977; van Assen & den Hertog,
“machine bureaucracy” faltered and got stuck at the moment it was supposed 
to produce more output. Labor appeared to be a vulnerable spot in the com­
plex structures that industrial engineering had produced. A number of large 
firms, including Philips, Olivetti, Volvo, SAAB, VW, and Renault, were look­
ing for alternatives to the mechanistic work systems. An important source of
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inspiration was provided by the sociotechnical systems approach, which was 
particularly successful in Northern Europe (Emery & Thorsrud, 1969). STSD 
was accepted as a common framework by labor market parties as a way to 
improve both motivation and productivity and to give shape to industrial de­
mocracy on the shop floor. It is characteristic of the European tradition that 
the developments in firms and the cooperation of firms with social scientists 
from universities was strongly supported by the public authorities. Coopera­
tion between social scientists, the trade unions, and the business community 
was encouraged by way of long-term development programs in Norway, Swe­
den, Germany, France, and The Netherlands (cf. Dankbaar, 1987; den Her- 
tog & Schroder, 1989). A comparable development can be observed in
Australia (Mathews, 1994).
This tradition, resulting from a period of boom, has survived the 
change in the economic tide in the 1980s and 1990s, but not without a 
clear shift in emphasis. The relevance of the quality of work is still recog­
nized, but the need to improve productivity and flexibility of the organiza­
tion is receiving more attention. The focus of these programs and projects 
has shifted and broadened from work design to organization design (cf. de 
Sitter, 1994). In the related theoretical research, the objective has become 
to find design principles that do not only lead to improvements in the qual­
ity of work, but also contribute clearly to an increase in organizational flexi­
bility and product quality and to reduction of bureaucracy. Furthermore, 
organization redesign has been more explicitly recognized in these pro­
grams as a key to effective introduction of modern production technology 
(Agurdn, 1989). This development toward organization redesign was rein­
forced by closer interaction with the strong engineering traditions in these 
countries, particularly in such countries as Germany and Sweden.
The development of IOR in The Netherlands has to be viewed in this 
perspective. During the mid-1970s, The Netherlands had already proven to 
be fertile ground for experimentation in work design. The leading company 
in this field was Philips (van Beek, 1964; den Hertog, 1977, 1978b), where 
more than 50 experimental sites were set up at the time. However, the 
diffusion of these new practices to other plants and other firms was slow 
if not completely absent in the late 1970s. Analysis of the reasons for this 
lack of diffusion (den Hertog, 1978b; van Assen & den Hertog, 1984) at 
the time revealed a difficult paradox. On the one hand, the lack of diffusion 
could be explained by the weakness of the way in which the workers in­
volved actually participated in the redesign process. The design process was, 
irrespective of all good intentions, in fact, dominated by design experts. 
General standard solutions were imposed on organizational members to 
solve local problems. Local contingencies and local knowledge were being 
disregarded. And even more important: solutions and problems were not
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owned by local players, but by experts from the outside. In this respect, 
the diffusion problem hardly differed from that described by Scandinavian 
writers (Gustavsen, 1992; S0rensen, 1985), and their recommendations for 
a further democratization of the organization were also supported in The 
Netherlands. However, at the same time it became clear that diffusion was 
also limited by the organizational environment in which the new work forms 
were embedded. It became apparent (van Assen & den Hertog, 1984) that 
the design of the product, the production technology, the firm’s logistical 
and accounting systems, and the division between line and staff determined 
the degrees of freedom for the introduction of semi-autonomous groups. 
It was argued that these powerful parameters themselves would also have 
to be tackled in the design phase. The possibilities for new forms of work 
organization had to be “designed-in.”
However, this observation made also evident that a mass of new ex­
pertise in each of the respective domains was needed to implement such 
integrated and preventive strategies. As a consequence, the tension be­
tween expertise and participation assumed a new shape. The question be­
came relevant to what extent the designers of these higher level systems 
would be willing to include QWL-considerations in their work and share 
their expert power with workers and supervisors on the shop floor. At the 
same time, it became evident (Mulder, 1977; Hedberg, 1975) that partici­
pation in situations where one party has all the expertise and the other 
little or none tends to increase, rather than decrease the power distance 
between designers and users. The strategy chosen to deal with this paradox 
aims to empower system users by increasing their design expertise. The 
IOR-approach follows this route. The first condition in this perspective is 
that management becomes convinced of the economic benefits of the ap­
proach. In order to change the organization as a whole, urgent problems 
of the whole should be solved, rather than only social problems on the 
shop floor. The second condition is the availability of a common body of 
design knowledge: a shared set of well-elaborated design concepts, princi­
ples, rules, and design sequences, validated in practice. It was acknowledged 
that such a design theory would have to go far beyond standard solutions 
which would only be applicable to one single level of the organization (for 
example, the semi-autonomous production group, which had become the 
traditional “solution” for re-design at the shop floor level).
The mission to develop such a design theory was taken up by a network 
of organization researchers, consultants, and managers, who organized 
themselves in the Netherlands Institute for the Improvement of the Quality 
of Work and Organization (NKWO). The design theory that emerged from 
this effort built on the theoretical work of de Sitter (de Sitter, 1981, 1994; 
de Sitter et a l, 1986), traditional sociotechnical systems theory (Emery,
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1959; Emery & Trist, 1960), the development work of the Swedish Employ­
ers Federation SAF (AgurSn & Edgren, 1980) and the design practice of 
a new consultancy bureau KOERS Consultants (van Ewijk-Hoevenaars et 
al., 1995). The objective was to develop a framework for organization re­
design which satisfied the following conditions:
• The design theory must embrace concepts and principles which are gen­
erally applicable irrespective of the specific nature of the organization.
• The design theory should focus on structural design as well as on 
the “learning” aspects of organizational development.
• The theory must open possibilities to customize the design for spe­
cific organizations.
• The theoiy must be easily applicable and manageable in actual practice.
• The design theory should be easily communicable and provide a lan­
guage in which managers and workers from different functional ar­
eas can talk effectively about the same organizational problems and 
solutions.
• The theory must incorporate active involvement of management and 
empowerment of the workers concerned.
• The theory cannot be partial in approach, but should deal with the 
organization as a whole.
These efforts have resulted in the IOR approach. To date, more than 50 
firms and public institutions have been engaged in major IOR projects in 
the Netherlands, not in the experimental sense of the 1970s, but as a real 
effort to turn the whole organization around. The range of firms engaging 
in IOR has been broad: from insurance firms like Aegon and Nationale 
Nederlanden, production plants of Philips’ component division and of Van 
Nelle Tobacco to the tank maintenance workshop of the Dutch army.
A FOUNDATION IN SYSTEMS THEORY
In its efforts to develop a generally applicable theory, the IOR approach 
has introduced some important amendments to the traditional STSD ap­
proach. These are concerned with the original elaboration of the open sys­
tems character of sociotechnical systems, the conceptual differentiation 
between a social and a technical “system,” and the ideal of joint optimization 
as a “best match” design principle (see also van der Zwaan, 1975).
Open Systems
The open systems approach says that a production system cannot be 
autonomous in its choice with respect to technology, industrial relations,
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social values, products, and services because it is at all sides tied to a time- 
dependent and changing technological, political, cultural, and economic en­
vironment. Traditional sociotechnical systems design has not always been 
able to deal with the implications of this approach in a satisfactory manner. 
For historical reasons, traditional STSD has stressed the importance of the 
human conditions which production systems should meet: the “Quality of 
Working Life” (QWL) (Davis & Cherns. 1975). A large part of its identity 
was derived from fulfilling a critical function in relation to Tàylorist con­
cepts, contending that the quality of work is important and should no longer 
be kept in disregard. An unconditional emphasis on QWL, however, cannot 
be reconciled with a truly “open” systems approach. The theoretical prob­
lem is to go beyond a plea for a reshuffling of priorities and to acquire 
insight into the manner in which organizational structures impede or foster 
the balance between a differentiated set of functions to be performed by 
the system.
This implies that, from a sociotechnical point of view, functional re­
quirements with respect to customers, the physical environment, the labor 
market, suppliers of capital, workers, etc., should be regarded as equivalent. 
Sociotechnical systems design should be as good in shortening delivery 
times and in designing effective information systems as in improving jobs. 
An open systems model presupposes a comprehensive or integral rather 
than a partial problem definition. If it would focus only on QWL, for in­
stance, sociotechnical systems design would simply join the range of already 
too numerous managerial specializations dealing with separate functional 
requirements, such as information science, production management, logis­
tics, auditing, maintenance, marketing, quality control, and so on.
The Distinction Between the “Social” and the “Technical” System
In traditional STSD a sociotechnical system is defined as a combination 
of a social and a technical subsystem. Insight into their mutual interdepend­
ence is the designer’s key to strike a balance between the two. This conven­
tional definition of the social and technical “systems” as subsystems, however, 
contradicts the notion of a production system as an integral functional system. 
Conceived as a subsystem, the social subsystem would contain all human ele­
ments (and their attributes such as attitudes, values, and norms), and the tech­
nical subsystem would represent mostly human artifacts such as chairs, tables, 
telephones, PCs, machines, buildings, and so on. Clearly, very little can be said 
about the relationships between elements grouped in such a manner. The iso­
lation of social and technical system elements into separate subsystems blocks 
the view of the functional relations between the two, which are at the heart 
of a real production system. In consequence, the concepts destroy the very
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object of analysis and impede rather than foster a comprehensive under­
standing of organizational dynamics.
Some have tried to save the notion of the two subsystems by arguing 
that one could differentiate between the social and technical aspects of all 
functional relations within a system. This would result in what could be called 
the social and technical “aspect systems.” Closer investigation, however, 
makes clear that this does not make sense either. The social aspects of one 
or more functional relations by themselves can never make up a system. A 
(sub)system is always a complete set of relations between various elements 
that together perform a certain function. Such relations are always social as 
well as technical. One can also think of accounting, human resources man­
agement, or materials management as “aspect systems,” i.e., as subsystems 
fulfilling specific subfunctions (filling in specific aspects) within the overall 
production system. Such aspect-systems, however, as they come into being in 
the form of subsets of interactions engaged in the production of a specific 
input-output function, always constitute a configuration of social as well as 
technical functions. Obviously, some aspect-systems have a higher social or 
technical “content” than others. The social aspects of human resources man­
agement are obvious and the quality of work could probably be enhanced by 
emphasizing social aspects in HRM. That remains a partial approach, how­
ever, with unclear implications for the functioning of the system as a whole.
Purely social or technical aspect-systems simply do not exist. The rela­
tions between social and technical aspects can therefore only be studied (and 
eventually “optimized”) within complete (sub)systems. In other words, the 
desire to optimize the relations between social and technical aspects requires 
an integral approach of the system. The approach should focus on the man­
ner in which a system’s structure determines its capacity to select, develop, 
coordinate, reconcile, and balance a multitude of input-output functions with 
respect to a multitude of interaction partners within the system and in its 
environment, each of which implies social as well as technical dimensions.
Joint Optimization as a Partial Design Approach
Traditional STSD advocates “joint optimization” of the social and tech­
nical system as a design principle (Emery & Trist, 1960). As we have just 
noted, this “best-match” approach contradicts the two basic concepts of an 
open and integral systems approach. The openness of the system emphasizes 
the need for adaptive and innovative control and balanced coordination of a 
multitude of separate input-output transactions with the environment, where 
each transaction contains social as well as technical dimensions. The integral 
character of the system underlines the need for adaptive and innovative con­
trol and balanced coordination of the relationships between a multitude of
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functionally differentiated internal functions, where, again, each function 
contains social as well as normative and technical dimensions. Apart from 
this lack of clarity in the use of the systems approach, there is also a major 
problem in the methods envisaged to achieve the desired “optimum.” The 
problem of compatibility of the social and technical subsystems (however de­
fined) is treated as a matter of counting pluses and minuses attached to al­
ternative partial designs of the separate systems (see, for example, Mumford 
& Weir, 1979). There is no consideration, however, of how the separate sys­
tems are supposed to fit together. It is logically impossible, however, to design 
a whole starting with the parts, but you can design (integral) parts starting 
from a vision of the whole.
The designers’ goal should be to design an architecture sustaining 
and reinforcing the development of interactive relationships which sup­
port and reinforce each other with respect to all functional requirements 
such as flexibility, delivery time, throughput time, product quality, inno­
vative capacity, pollution control, quality of work, and industrial relations. 
The conclusion of these fundamental theoretical considerations is there­
fore that IOR can only open new perspectives by fulfilling a truly com­
prehensive function with respect to the question  of how sets of 
differentiated and purposive functions can be grouped and coupled into 
an organizational structure in such a manner that they mutually sustain 
and reinforce each other.
A BROAD OUTLINE OF IOR: BASIC CONCEPTS
The conceptual developments in the Netherlands as sketched above 
have resulted in a new paradigm for sociotechnical organization design, 
based on a number of primary considerations with respect to;
• The concept of Integral Design
• The concept of Controllability
• The twin concepts of Production Structure and Control Structure
• The concept of Structural Parameters
The Concept o f Integtul Design. A truly integral sociotechnical design 
is structural design: it should be based on insight into the interaction be­
tween aspect-systems (the logistic aspect-system, the quality aspect-system, 
the maintenance aspect-system, the personnel aspect-system, etc.) and sub­
systems (the sales subsystem, product design subsystem, planning subsys­
tem, lathing, drilling, packaging, service subsystems, etc.). All system 
elements (individuals as well as tools and machines) involved in the differ­
entiated sets of aspect-systems and subsystems are by definition tied and 
coupled in time as a function of the systems structure. It is, therefore, the
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specific architecture of a systems structure which should be viewed as the 
central object of sociotechnical theory and design. Sociotechnical theory 
explains how a specific architecture determines the opportunities for coor­
dination, adaptation, and innovation of system-internal and external func­
tions. Sociotechnical design is concerned with creating and using such 
opportunities by changing the architecture.
The Concept o f Controllability. The second basic concept is the concept 
of controllability. Control does not refer here to specific goals or interests 
to be attained, but rather to shaping structural conditions for opportunities 
to formulate and implement goals. The basic sociotechnical question is 
therefore not to improve a systems’ capacity to achieve a certain goal ac­
cording to prescribed criteria, for example, the criterion of delivery tunc 
or product quality or QWL, but to improve a system's “controllability": the 
ability to achieve a range of objectives. As we do not know what the future, 
will bring, we do not know the specific objects and problems to be con 
trolled. Therefore, the designer’s goal must be to improve a system's 
neric capacity to control. Moreover, the degree of controllability must 
satisfy criteria of effectiveness as well as efficiency. The degree of system 
controllability (Sc) can be conceived as a function of the ratio between 
opportunities and requirements for variation (Ashby, 1952):
<«
c available opportunities for process variation
variation required
Combining the notion of controllability with the notion of integral design, 
the conclusion must be that IOR should study the manner in which alter­
native architectures of structure influence a system’s* controllability. The& & 
specific architecture of a production system’s structure fosters or restrict** 
the opportunities for effective and efficient control of the required com 
dination between functionally differentiated processes, which may interfere 
with each other and may impede each other's completion. The cute of so 
ciotechnical inquiry is therefore the analysis and identification of .structural 
parameters which together determine a system’s interference probability 
and sensitivity with respect to a balanced production of internat and ex­
ternal functions in time. This endeavor requires » general conception uf 
architecture as well as the identification of the main structural parameters 
(dimensions) which can serve to differentiate between architecture*, 
and—in further analysis-are to be related to the probabilities uf tliMttr>
bance (interference) and the sensitivity to disturbance (i.e., the capacity tu 
reduce interference).
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The Twin Concepts o f Production Stmcture and Control Structure. In a 
purposive and therefore selective process, two basic functions are always 
involved (see Appendix B):
• control: the selection of relations to be performed;
• performance: the realization of selected relations.
From the point of view of design methodology, IO R therefore proposes to 
introduce a distinction between the structure of two basic aspect-systems:
• production structure: the grouping and coupling of performance 
functions.
• control structure: the allocation and coupling of control functions,
The Concept o f Structural Parameters. Integral organizational renewal 
always implies change with respect to basic structural parameters. A de­
signer should know how parameters are related to organizational deficien­
cies, and which parameters are in fact involved in various design questions 
and why. Parameters refer to the primary architectural dimensions of the 
production structure and the control structure, The following list of impor­
tant structural parameters points to various distinctions, the majority of 
which have already been in use in managerial science, organizational soci­
ology, and business administration for a long time. A substantial knowledge 
base is therefore available on the relations between different values for 
these parameters and the probabilities of disturbance (interference) and 
the sensitivity to disturbance (i,e„ the capacity to reduce interference) of 
organizations,
1. Functional Concentration. Functional concentration refers to the 
grouping and coupling of performance functions with respect to orders 
or—-in more general terms—with respect to input-output combinations or 
transformations. In principle, there are two extremes: all system transfor­
mations (order types) are potentially coupled to all subsystems (concentra­
tion), or each order type is produced in its own corresponding subsystem 
(deconcentration in parallel flows). This structural parameter is perhaps 
the most important one because high functional concentration limits very 
much the freedom of choice with respect to the remaining parameters and 
is responsible for deficiencies with respect to delivery times, quality, mar­
keting, quality of working life, innovative capacity, etc. Functional concen­
tration is still a dominant feature of most current production systems,
2. Performance Differentiation. Performance differentiation refers to the 
separation of the functions to prepare, to support and to make, into spe­
cialized subsystems.
3. Performance Specialization. Performance specialization refers to split­
ting up a performance function into a number of performance subfunctions
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and to allocating them to separate subsystems. According to the conven­
tional production concept the number of such subsystems should be maxi­
mized with only capacity utilization as a restriction.
4. Separation of Performance and Control Functions. Separation refer* 
here to the allocation of a performance and corresponding control functior 
to different elements (individuals or machines) or subsystems.
5. Control Specialization. Allocation of the control of functional aspects 
to separate aspect-systems (quality, maintenance, logistics, personnel, etc.).
6. Control Differentiation. Splitting domains of control into separate 
control levels (strategic, structural, and operational).
7. Division of Control Functions. A control cycle always contains a 
“sensing” or “perceiving” function, a “judging” function, and an “action 
selection” function. Division of control refers to the allocation of these 
functions to separate elements (individuals and/or machines) or subsystems.
FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE IOR DESIGN APPROACH
The basic concepts summarized in the preceding section point to the 
possibility of integral (re)design of organizations by varying the main ar­
chitectural parameters characterizing the production and control structure. 
The next step is to elaborate a practical design strategy incorporating these 
concepts. The design strategy of IOR is based on the use of a structured 
body of knowledge concerning the design of organizations in the context 
of a participative design process. Elaboration of the strategy therefore re­
quires on the one hand the formulation of design principles, design strate­
gies, and design sequence rules, in order to construct and structure a body 
of knowledge which can be used as a tool in system structuring; on the 
other hand, it requires the specification of a model for participation in 
design activities. This section provides a brief overview of the elaboration 
of design principles and design sequence rules. The next section discusses 
the models and modes of participation. Possible tensions between the use 
of a codified design theory and participation will be discussed in a sub­
sequent section.
Design Principles and Design Strategies
Design principles refer to structural solutions with a rather generic 
bearing. In the IOR approach, these principles are primarily concerned 
with the problem of complexity. The complexity of a system is a function 
of the number of its elements, the number of their internal and external 
relations, and their variability in time. Conventional bureaucratic produc-
Complex and Simple Organizations and Jobs 509
tion systems tend to maximize on the structural parameters mentioned and 
are therefore complex. Increasing complexity is related to:
• increasing process variability,
• increasing probabilities of disturbance, and
• increasing sensitivity to disturbance,
all of which results in an increasing inability to deal quickly and adequately 
with changing demands made upon the organization, i.e., in reduced con­
trol.
The basic principles of integral design should therefore be:
• to reduce disturbance probabilities by a reduction of impending va­
riety;
• to reduce disturbance sensitivity by an increase in control capacity.
The production structure determines the manner in which performance 
functions are related to order flows. Impending variety must always be dealt 
with by process variation. A  good design of the production structure can 
limit the impact of impending variety, e.g., by directing “exotic” orders to 
specific parts of the organization. The degree to which performance func­
tions are differentiated, split or coupled, limits or enhances the structural 
options for process variation. On the other hand, the utilization of such 
built-in options for process variation is—from the point of view of integral 
design—a function of the control structure. Control capacity can only be 
increased if opportunities for process variation are available.
The principle of controllability should therefore be applied to the de­
sign of both the production structure and the control structure, and it 
should be applied in this order. The design of the production structure 
aims to reduce the variation required. The design of the control structure 
ensures that options for process variation are utilized if required. Applica­
tion of the principle of controllability to the production structure and con­
trol structure, respectively implies:
^  „ t , . a available means to vary performance functions
Controllability production structure =  f ------------------------ ;■■ — ;— ---------------------
variation required
_ „ . . . .  , ' ' £ control information available
Controllability control structure =  f --------- — --------- :-----------:— -
control information required
Together, the structural design measures in this respect should produce 
controllability at the level of individual tasks, which is called the quality of 
work:
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. control capacity built into the task 
Quality of work control capacity required
The design principles provide structure to organizational solutions to the 
problem of complexity (and to the process of finding them). Design strate­
gies refer to both the specific methods of analysis and the varying forms 
of application of the design principles. Functional deconcentration, for ex­
ample, could be an important strategy for structural redesign in both an 
engineering plant, an automobile assembler, and an insurance company. 
The methods of analysis needed to find the right solution as well as the 
specific form of deconcentration to be applied, however, would be very 
different. The engineering plant would probably be restructured into par­
allel integrated flows of component families, which are defined by their 
degree of homogeneity in terms of processing technology. Redesign of con­
ventional automobile assembly would require a re-sequencing of operations 
into functional homogeneous phase-segments and parallelization into sepa­
rate but largely identical flows, whereas the insurance company would con­
sider the integration of policy design, sales, and retributions into parallel
market segments.
It is impossible to give a full account here of the design principles, 
strategies, and sequence rules as they are currently in use in sociotechnical 
consultancy in the Netherlands (de Sitter et al., 1986, 1994; Kuipers & van 
Amelsvoort, 1990). The following overview must be understood as no more 
than a gathering of examples and comments.
Designing the Production Structure: Parallelization (Parameter 1). A good 
design improves both efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, “variation re­
quired” should be kept as small as possible. From this it follows that the 
general design strategy is to reduce required variation and to increase op­
tions for process variation. Enlarging the opportunities for process variation 
is rather easy to understand: the importance of flexible automation and 
highly trained multiskilled personnel and integrated tasks is generally ac­
cepted. However, the reduction of required variation also needs attention. 
Required variation is triggered by two sources: external (demand) variation 
and system-internal local variation. External variation consists mainly of 
rapid changes in the demand for product mix and volumes. How can such 
demand variety be reduced without getting out of business? Parallelization 
is an important option. By the introduction of parallel flows the impact of 
demand variation on the need for internal variation can be considerably 
reduced. The effect of parallelization is always an exponential reduction of 
input complexity, which is an illustration of the importance of the first 
structural parameter, functional concentration.
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Paralielization
Fig. 1. Paralielization and segmentation.
Designing the Production Structure: Segmentation (Parameters 2 and 3). 
Again, variation is variation, but one can reduce its amplifying effects by 
structural design. Exponential amplification of internal variation sources is 
caused by the number of relations or interfaces between performance func­
tions involved in the chain between input and output. In the prevailing 
functional structures of today, performance functions of the same technical 
type are grouped together into specialized departments. The number of 
interfaces between these specialized departments is necessarily high. Re­
duction of internal variation is mainly a matter of reduction of interfaces. 
By paralielization, external input variety is reduced by creating independent 
parallel flows, preferably corresponding to product market combinations. 
Segmentation of individual flows aims to reduce internal variety by selective 
clustering of performance functions into segments with a minimum of in­
terfaces (Fig. 1). Segmentation requires in the first place clustering of per­
formance operations with a maximum of mutual interdependence in direct 
production.
Segmentation of performance functions offers a starting point for a 
corresponding segmentation and/or integration of support and preparatoiy 
functions in the next step. The concluding step in the design strategy of 
the production structure is the internal structuring of segments. Reduction 
of required variety is the main goal in paralielization and segmentation. 
Now, design should be directed to reinforcing available means for process 
variation. On this micro level it is no longer feasible to limit the attention 
strictly to the performance functions. Instead, performance and control
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Table I, Parailelization and Segmentation
Firm
Nationale Ned­
erlanden Gen­
eral Insurance
Division (1200 
employees)
St. Antonius 
Vesselheads 
(manufacturer 
of heads and 
specially 
formed parts 
for pressure 
vessels and 
pipelines, 140 
employees)
Parailelization
The old organization: based on 
insurance products (fire, motor, 
travel, and so on); the new 
organization: all insurance products 
are handled in regional teams 
serving a group of customers 
(insurance intermediaries).
The old organization: based on 
production functions like staining, 
welding, machining, metal cutting 
and assembly; The new 
organization: the functions are 
integrated in three units, each 
being responsible for a family of 
products: formed heads, hot and 
cold press products, and assembled 
products.
Segmentation
Within each regional team, one 
subgroup is responsible for the 
acceptance of risks and another for 
the assessment of claims (the 
option is open to integrate these 
groups at a later stage).
Both the preparatory work (“plate 
material supply”) and the final 
work (finishing and shipping) for 
the three parallel flows are 
allocated to one department.
functions are simultaneously considered; in terms of performance differen­
tiation and specialization (parameters 2 and 3), in terms of separation of 
control and performance functions (parameter 4), in terms of the degree 
of internal control specialization and differentiation (parameters 5 and 6), 
and in terms of the division between control functions (parameter 7).
Table I gives examples of both parailelization and segmentation in an 
industrial firm and a firm in the service sector. The IOR approach incor­
porates the traditional interest of sociotechnical design in semi-autonomous 
groups as the basic unit of work organization. This involves a strong inter­
dependence between flexible multiskilled tasks within the group, flexible 
technical equipment, options for coordination, complete internal process 
control, participation in boundary control, and responsibility for operational 
and structural improvements and innovations. The options for creating such 
“complete-task groups” are heavily dependent on the right choices in the 
preceding strategies of parailelization and segmentation. Segmentation is
therefore a very important and decisive operation in the process of integral 
sociotechnical design.
Designing the Control Structure: Unity of Time, Location, and Action (Pa­
rameters 4, 5, 6} 7), Less variety and fewer interfaces imply a reduction of 
required control. In consequence, experience shows that up to 80% of all 
control questions with respect to coping with complex variety and interfer­
ence have already been solved by the preceding architectural (re)design of 
the production structure. Having redesigned the production structure, we 
now turn to the control structure. The control cycle is the building block
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of control structures. In its elementary form the control cycle consists of 
four interrelated functions:
sensing: perception of process states;
judging: evaluation per aspect;
judging: integrated evaluation of aspects;
action selection: choice of control activity.
These four functions form a control cycle in which the performance func­
tion is a starting and end point. The basic structure of the control cycle is 
independent of the control level: the operational level controlling opera­
tions on the basis of given step norms, the structuring level generating such 
norms on the basis of models with respect to production and control struc­
tures, given the organizational goals, and the strategic level, evaluating 
goals given environmental conditions.
A control structure can be defined as the allocation, selection, and 
coupling of control cycles. Only variety induces a need for control The 
“control information required” as contained in the definition of the “con­
trollability of the control structure” discussed above is therefore a function 
of impending variety. Reduction of variety has already been taken care of 
in the preceding design of the production structure. It implies reduced need 
for control. This is of course precisely the reason why the design of the 
production structure should precede the design of the control structure. 
“Control required” is the shared factor that links production structure to 
control structure. The design of the control structure should therefore be 
directed toward the remaining factor: reinforcing and improving the avail­
ability and use of control information through structuring the allocation, 
selection, and coupling of control cycles.
Availability of control information should of course be read as: avail­
ability of effective information. The effectiveness of control information is 
a function of:
• reliability: correspondence between facts and perceptions;
• actuality: time span between occurrence of variation and a corre­
sponding control action;
• completeness: overview of all current conditions defining the situ­
ation;
• relevance: memory and experience, learning capacity.
Together, these four “requisites for effective information” obviously refer 
to the separation between time of occurrence and perception, between time 
of perception and action, and to the location of occurrence as a binding 
factor between the two. Separation should be reduced and “unity of time, 
place, and action” is the leading principle.
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In the daily practice of a self-managing team in tobacco production, 
for example, this means that the team:
• gathers quality data during the process as well as quality data on 
finished products;
• diagnoses production problems on the basis of single parameters 
(“symptoms”) and on sets of parameters (“syndromes”); and
. decides to interfere in the process itself or to call for external assis­
tance (Roberts, 1993).
Designing the Control Structure: Bottom-up Allocation o f Control Cycles 
(Parameter 4). In principle, everything can be controlled top-down, albeit 
at the cost of control efficiency and effectiveness. Only by allocating control 
cycles bottom up will it be possible to discriminate between cycles that 
could be allocated both to the micro level of individual workstations and 
to the meso level of whole-task groups or segments. This procedure is 
called “stepwise elimination.” From the total set of cycles to be allocated, 
those that can be allocated to the micro level are eliminated. Next, from 
the remaining set, cycles are allocated to the meso levels of aggregation 
and so on, up to the global level. In order to reduce the complexity of this 
procedure, it is wise to start at the level of segments or whole-task groups. 
In this way, the range of control at the group or segment level is first de­
termined. Subsequently, the procedure is repeated inside each whole-task 
group or segment, the micro level now being defined as a particular ma­
chine or workstation.
The options for allocation—keeping the design principle of “unity of 
time, place, and action” in mind—are determined by the preceding design 
of the production structure. Without parallelization and segmentation there 
would be no (whole-task) segments and there would be no deconcentration 
of preparatory, support, and manufacturing functions into conveniently ar­
ranged, surveyable independent flows. In such an architecture, very few 
control cycles could be allocated to the micro and meso aggregation levels 
and we would be forced to take the consequences in terms of raised vol­
umes of requisite control information, and low degrees of flexibility, quality 
control, innovative capacity, and quality of work.
Building Control Capacity in Every Task (Parameters 1 to 7). An indi­
vidual work process can be conceived as the smallest possible presentation 
of production organization. Therefore, the logic of control theory applies 
to all levels of aggregation and quality of work is just a micro presentation 
of the same problem: how to strike a balance between interference prob­
lems (variation) from different input sectors with which the worker is con­
fronted, and his/her ability to control by utilization of control capacity the 
normative completion of a multitude of interaction cycles he/she is engaged
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in as a member of a group or social network. In this sense, quality of work 
is a function of the problems someone can meet in the course of work and 
the means at disposal to cope with them (de Sitter, 1970; Karasek, 1979).
Design Sequence Rules
The design sequence rules are an absolutely necessary tool in IOR, 
not only in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in design, but also 
to structure the process of design in such a manner that it becomes clear 
to the participants why some questions come first and others later, and 
why managers should be involved in the solution of X and workers in the 
manufacturing division should be involved in the solution of Y. Again, it 
is impossible to give a full account of design-sequence rules. We have to 
restrict ourselves to a short overview of the most fundamental ones, which 
should always be observed.
Rule 1. Design the Production Structure First and Then Proceed with the 
Design o f the Control Structure* Very often this rule is broken, with disas­
trous results. It is common practice, for example, to design new control 
structures for given production structures. The complexity of control is, 
however, determined by the complexity of the production structure. The 
results are of course disappointing: high investments in information tech­
nology, but no substantial improvements with respect to flexibility, delivery 
times, product quality, reduction of stock, and quality of work.
Rule 2a. Design the Production Structure Top-Down. Integral design re­
quires starting from the whole at the macro level (identification of possible 
parallel flows), proceeding to the meso level (segmentation), and concluding 
with the elaboration of the structure of whole-task groups at the micro level
Rule 2b. The Design of the Production Structure Precedes the Design o f 
Process Technology, Process equipment presupposes couplings to input de­
livering elements and couplings to output receivers. Effective and efficient 
utilization of equipment therefore depends upon the specific architecture 
of the structure in which they are applied, because it is structure that de­
termines these couplings. Moreover, application of technology implies the 
grouping and coupling of machines and instruments. The required reper­
toire of performance and control functions they should be able to execute, 
depends of course on their allocation within the overall system structure 
with respect to production order flows. Technical requirements in terms of 
repertoire flexibility, production volumes, and options for couplings be­
tween CAD, CAM, and other automation applications can only be specified 
after design and evaluation of the optimal system structure. Structural ad­
aptation to equipment is therefore only justified if it appears impossible to 
meet the technical demands deduced from structural design.
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Rule 3. Design the Control Structure Bottom-Up. The logic of this rule 
has already been discussed. One starts with the allocation of control cycles 
at the micro level of local control and proceeds to the allocation of control 
cycles to the meso level of interlocal and macro level of global control. 
The “stepwise elimination” procedure ensures:
• careful design of individual tasks,
• modular architecture of the control structure and therefore options 
to improve or change control structures per module (segment, 
whole-task group, production cell, FMS, etc.),
• flexible options for stepwise implementation of a redesigned control
structure.
Rule 4. Design Control Cycles According to the Sequence: Allocation, 
Selection, and Coupling Unity of time, place, and action is the leading prin­
ciple. The location of sources of variation determines the allocation of cor­
responding control cycles. The scope of control activities is determined by 
the selection of the primary dimensions of the control range required in a 
given location. Couplings are derived from the allocated and selected 
ranges of control cycles with special attention given to the required lead 
time between the coupling of data to the local control of processing.
THE PARTICIPATIVE CHANGE STRATEGY
In our description of the IOR participative change strategy, we have 
to confine ourselves to the first main steps in the redesign process. The 
steps involving implementation and consolidation of redesign are obviously 
of paramount importance but cannot be covered here, since they show a 
considerable variety and require a full discussion of change management. 
The major projects carried out on the basis of the IOR approach have 
lasted 2 to 4 years and were shaped by the active involvement of a large 
number of employees. No wonder that there are no two projects which 
follow exactly the same course. It should be noted that in actual practice, 
of course, IOR is not the linear and standardized process as presented 
below. Within the broad framework of the strategy, there is always a need 
to customize the approach to the local contingencies. Still, in most projects 
the main lines as sketched here can be recognized (Fig. 2).
Step 1. Raising Awareness of the Need for Change. Firms won’t set them­
selves in motion only because they are confronted with new and inspiring 
ideas. Before the first plan of action is written down, management, staff, 
workers, and the works council have to build up the belief in the new route 
for themselves. Intra-organizational barriers must be broken down and re­
sources be made available. The phrase “readying the unready” charac-
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Fig. 2. The change trajectoiy.
terizes this often painstaking pre-phase. Tbp management plays a special 
role here. It has to act as a promoter of the new norms and values. IOR 
demands leadership in the real sense. In most projects, one of the top man­
agers plays the central, or even “heroic,” role in starting the motor of 
change and keeping it running. This implies also the assurance of the re­
sources needed to carry out the redesign. Innovation costs time and money. 
It is no use to start an intensive change effort only to find out a year later 
that there is no money or no capacity to take the essential steps. The de­
cision to invest in change is the first milestone of the project. The project 
can start.
Step 2: Strategic Orientation. The following step is a strategic explora­
tion of the strengths and weaknesses of the firm to be compared with the 
threats and opportunities implied in its environment. The analysis is carried 
out by a group of about 20 persons. This group is composed of the man­
agement team and people from the various functions and sectors needed 
to obtain an overview of the problems and possibilities. The chairperson 
of the works council (a representative body elected by the workforce) is
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usually also a member of the group. Sometimes, firms already have expe­
rience with a strategic planning phase. Usually, just a small elite group 
from the firm has been involved in such an exercise. In such cases, firms 
are urged to repeat the whole process with a larger group and with more 
openness. Both the quality of the analysis and the involvement in the re­
newal process benefit from that. The main output of the strategic explo­
ration phase is a document containing a list of external functional 
(performance) requirements, and an overview of discrepancies between cur­
rent and required performance. This results in a quantified and specified 
summary of external performance criteria for the system to be redesigned.
Step 3: Structural Exploration. The strategic analysis points to discrep­
ancies between required and actual external performance. Study is sub­
sequently needed with respect to the question of how these may be related 
to the characteristics of the system’s internal structure. A structural explo­
ration must be carried out. This is done by a thorough inventory of all 
current problems in terms of disturbances of any kind. This requires train­
ing in how to “map” such shortcomings in a projection of the existing pro­
duction and control structure. Training courses are available and have been 
adapted to organizational levels. Hundreds of problems may be listed. Next, 
the selected problems are divided into structural and nonstructural ones, 
and priorities are established by comparison with the document of external 
performance requirements.
The distinction between structural and nonstructural problems allows 
for starting up improvement activities that can and should be taken care 
of immediately and that do not require fundamental changes in structure. 
When there are acute problems of quality, the customer cannot be fobbed 
off with the announcement that the firm is in the middle of a renewal 
process. Furthermore, a great deal of problems can be solved without any 
structural changes. The immediate solution of some sometimes longstand­
ing problems can be an important factor creating and enhancing support 
for the process of change. The output of the structural exploration is a 
document of internal performance criteria which is the main and crucial 
input for the following design phase.
Step 4: On-the-Job Training for Self-Design. The actual vehicle for re­
newal is an intensive training program. The basic idea is that the members 
of the organization have to learn to design themselves. They are an im­
portant source of expertise: the knowledge and experience gained in their 
own work situation. However, a participative approach and this expertise 
do not suffice to make an efficient design. In order to do so, one must 
learn to analyze one’s own work organization and to make links with other 
functions and subsystems. It is essential for them to become familiar with 
analytical principles and design methods. The training is a type of on-the-
Complex and Simple Organizations and Jobs 519
job training: the own organization provides the content and the material. 
The prime objective of such training is to enable members of different or­
ganizational levels to take the design in their own hands. In this approach, 
the emphasis is placed on cognitive transfer. Its effects, however, go far 
beyond. The dynamics created in the organization are enormous. The train­
ing has a mobilizing character: it becomes clear to the members of the 
organization that their problems are being seriously dealt with and that 
their opinion is taken earnestly. Another important effect is that one learns 
to speak the same language: the plant manager is able to talk about his 
work situation in the same terms as the maintenance engineer. Finally, this 
training appears to be an adequate method to break through functional 
boundaries. Participants are part of a multidisciplinary team for a long pe­
riod of time and learn to view the production and control process through 
the same glasses.
Step 5: Redesign. The document of internal performance criteria is the 
input of the design phase, which evolves from general to particular. As 
indicated, first the production structure is put under discussion, The design 
questions follow the “top-down sequence”: macro (parallelization), meso 
(segmentation), and micro; the internal structuring of segments. Of course, 
the trajectory is iterative: one may move backward and forward in finding 
the right solution. Next, the control structure is dealt with. The direction 
of the design process is now reversed: bottom-up, At the start there is just 
one design group for the basic structure; as one proceeds, more design 
groups are actively involved in the process, thus increasing the need for a 
better match between the subdesigns. The design proposals are exchanged 
and discussed within the organization, the work consultation group, and 
the works council.
Project Structure. The project structure follows conventional lines con­
sisting of a steering group, project groups, and work groups. The steering 
group is responsible for the definition of the final plan. In a number of cases, 
a separate and temporary project structure is established, which may be par­
ticularly important in greenfield projects, or in situations in which product 
and/or process technology are faced with radical changes. In such cases, one 
consciously distinguishes between old and new. When the emphasis is placed 
on redesign, where the switch from old to new is a gradual process, it may 
be wise to have the management team and steering group coincide.
We cannot discuss here the multivariegated practices of implementa­
tion and consolidation of the redesign. Obviously, it will seldom happen 
that a clear dividing line can be drawn between design on the one hand 
and implementation on the other. In practice, implementation will lead to 
new questions of design and will give rise to new feedback loops in a proc­
ess of continuous specification.
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The process of organizational renewal proposed here clearly takes up 
a considerable length of time. Much-publicized concepts like Lean Produc­
tion and BPR appear to promise much quicker results. We would argue, 
however, that to a large extent these are only promises which cannot be 
backed up by hard results. Obviously, depending on the urgency of the 
situation, steps 1 and 2 can be done rather quickly also under IOR. The 
main goal of these steps is to achieve consensus. Under step 3, the distinc­
tion between structural (i.e., structure-related) and nonstructural problems 
serves to identify actions that can be undertaken immediately. These quick 
actions appear sometimes to be quite similar to actions undertaken under 
the banner of lean production and continuous improvement schemes. The 
following steps involving training and participation of a substantial number 
of employees in the actual redesign undoubtedly take time. However, it 
can be considered relatively low cost investment, if it creates a solid backing 
for the subsequent implementation of redesign, which we would argue will 
often be lacking in a similar top-down BPR exercise. Moreover, all projects 
show that knowledge on the actual processes in the organization is usually 
not available in one location inside the enterprise, let alone outside. A re­
design, which is based on knowledge that is available basically in one place 
will be far from optimal if compared to a redesign based on the knowledge 
that is present throughout the workforce. A good design with a broad back­
ing in the organization obviously can be implemented much quicker than 
an incomplete, imposed design. Interestingly, we have the impression that 
in the course of time, employees in the Netherlands at least have become 
much more accustomed to the idea of redesign, which has resulted in a 
greater openness toward training and a speeding up of redesign and im­
plementation processes.
COMBINING AN EXPERT APPROACH WITH PARTICIPATION
As an applied design strategy, IOR aims at the successful implemen­
tation of organizational change. In the sociotechnical view (Dankbaar & 
den Hertog, 1990; Gustavsen & Engelstad, 1985), successful change cannot 
be an imposed one. This is an important difference with, for example, most 
proponents of Business Process Re-engineering (BPR). The latter tend to 
think that radical change can only come about swiftly if it is imposed from 
above (Hammer & Champy, 1993). IOR emphasizes that radical redesign 
can indeed be realized swiftly if necessary, but only if it has a solid basis 
in the organization. It is, therefore, crucial that the redesign is carried out 
by the organization members themselves in a participative manner. How­
ever, even if power and functional expertise would be equally distributed 
among organization members, participation by itself would not guarantee
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a choice for an optimal sociotechnical solution. Sociotechnical design, how­
ever participative it may be, has to rely on design expertise. It is therefore 
necessary to transfer some basic knowledge of sociotechnical concepts, 
methods of analysis, design principles, and strategies to the members of 
the organization.
There are various ways of using expert knowledge in a participative 
context and there is considerable debate about the relative importance of 
both kinds of knowledge in organizational (re)design. The approach p re­
sented in the preceding section has been developed in the Netherlands in 
consultancy and training work by several organizations. One can view this 
approach as the organization development side of IOR. This approach is 
not presented as the road to success, but as a pattern which has emerged 
from design projects in over a dozen firms and has proved to offer a serious 
perspective on systemwide and lasting change (see Table II). These projects 
resulted in a number of important lessons concerning the change process 
and the role of experts (Kuipers & van Amelsvoort, 1990; Dankbaar & 
den Hertog, 1990; van Ewijk-Hoevenaars et a l, 1995).
The first lesson is that redesign should offer realistic alternative struc­
tures at firm or plant level. It is useless, for example, to start with job 
design at the shop floor level. The degrees of freedom for job design are 
to a large extent determined by the technical and organizational structures 
and processes in which tasks and roles are embedded: the production hard­
ware, the logistical systems, and the relation between line and staff. W ithout 
tackling these basic structures, job design experiments will fade away like 
sand castles at the seashore. For instance, substantial redesign of produc­
tion work in a television assembly plant is impossible without an alternative 
solution to materials handling. The creation of self-regulating work groups 
in an engineering firm won't last if planning and control tasks are not 
shifted from the central support staff down to the production groups on 
the shop floor. Integration of thinking and doing demands, almost without 
exception, a smaller support staff and a decentralized but stronger produc­
tion organization. In the IOR approach, it is essential that in the redesign 
of the production structure, degrees of freedom are created first, before 
the redesign of jobs and the design of complete-task groups at the shop 
floor level can be undertaken.
The second lesson refers to the participation of workers involved in 
the decision-making about the new organization. Involvement of the work­
ers in redesign is an essential condition. The same holds for management 
and support staff. The redesign has to be “their redesign” and not a solu­
tion introduced by outside experts. However, participation is not a sufficient 
condition to set the organization in motion and to change its basic struc­
tures. Research in the engineering workshops of Philips concerning organ-
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Table IL A Sample of IOR Projects
Firm before change Implemented changes Problems and effects
St. Antonius Vesselheads 
(140 employees,
1988—92). Manufacturer 
of heads and specially 
formed parts for pressure 
vessels and pipelines. 
Functional organization 
(job shop), both in staff 
services and in produc­
tion, Sources: Roberts
(1993); Bussemakers and 
den Hertog (1995).
Zilverstad Silversmithing 
(70 employees, 1990-93). 
Manufacturer of premi­
ums and corporate gifts, 
jewelry and souvenirs. 
Functional organization, 
centralized staff. Source: 
Roberts, den Hertog, 
and van den Oetelaar, 
1995.
Flow-oriented production (three 
parallel flows). Integration of 
staff services according to the 
flows. Segmentation, 
Decentralization of control task 
to self-managing teams. New 
team-based management 
accounting system.
Fiow-oriented production, 
parallelization according to 
product family (batch size). 
Integration of production and 
control task in the four self- 
managing teams.
Van Nelle Tobacco (250 
employees, 1986-88). 
Functional centralized 
staff, functionalized pro­
duction. Source: Roberts
(1993).
Philips Stadskanaal (1000 
employees, 1986-93). 
Manufacturer of semi­
conductors and compo­
nent for TV tubes. Func­
tionalized staff and 
production. Sources: 
Bussemakers and den 
Hertog (1995); Haak
(1994).
Introduction of business groups, 
parallellization according to 
product characteristics, 
segmentation of upstream 
production tasks, 
decentralization of staff, new 
team-based management 
accounting system.
Introduction of business groups. 
Decentralization of staff to 
production units (operational 
group). Parallelization and 
segmentation in production 
according to product type.
Problems: Sharper demands 
(quality, timeliness, and 
delivery reliability) in the 
OEM market. Effects: 
shorter throughput times, 
less work in progress, lower 
inventories, quality 
improvement, lower down­
times, higher productivity.
Problems; Competition from 
the Far East urged the firm 
to look for new markets for 
high added-value products. 
The old organization was 
not fit to cope with the 
emerging complexity in 
terms of delivery and 
quality. Effects: Higher 
productivity, shorter delivery 
times, higher reliability of 
delivery, less inventory. 15% 
increase in turnover, while 
the silverware industry in the 
Netherlands faces 15% lower 
turnover in the same period. 
Lower absenteeism.
Problems: inflexibility, high 
production costs, pigeon 
holing. Management had to 
realize a buy out and offer 
investors a new perspective. 
Effects: lower production 
costs, higher flexibility, 
shorter delivery times, less 
inventory, higher quality.
Problems; The plant had to 
fight against closure. I.ow 
productivity, inflexibility, too 
long delivery times. Effects: 
The plant grows again. On 
the productivity list of 
Philips component division it 
rose from the bottom to the 
top. The plant received a 
quality award.
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Firm before change
Table II. Continued 
Implemented changes
Philips Turnhout (160 
employees, 1991-94). 
Manufacturer of small 
batches of high added- 
value speciality bulbs. 
Functionalized produc­
tion. Source: Bussemak- 
ers and den Her tog
(1995).
AKZO-NOBEL, Fibers 
(200 employees,
1990-94). Business unit, 
Manufacturer of non- 
wovens. Worked with 
five function-oriented 
shifts. Source: Bussemak- 
ers and den Hertog, 1995.
Nationale Nederlanden, 
General insurances divi­
sion. (2000 employees,
1991-94). Works for in­
surance intermediaries. 
Functional organization 
according to type of in­
surance. Centralized com­
mercial function.
Integrated production teams. 
Introduction of flow-lines. 
Parallellization and 
segmentation on the basis of 
product characteristics. Closer 
linkages between development 
and production. Self-managing 
teams.
Introduction of three self- 
managing groups 
(parallellization) according to 
product/market combinations. 
Decentralization of staff 
activities to the production 
teams.
Split in two divisions: business 
and private insurances, 
Introduction of regional 
insurance teams working for 
their own set of intermediaries. 
The teams cover the whole 
range of insurance types, 
Decentralization of the 
commercial function to the 
teams. Introduction of 
knowledge management in 
order to secure functional 
knowledge.
Problems and effects
Problems: Rapidly growing 
market for new products. 
The plant was too slow for 
coping with product 
innovation. High inventory, 
long throughput times. Too 
large number of rejects. 
Effects: Faster introduction 
of new products in 
production. Higher quality 
and reliability of delivery.
Problems: This business unit 
was making a good profit, 
but the demands from the 
market (quality, price, 
variety in product types) 
were becoming increasingly 
tight. Effects: Higher 
flexibility, productivity, 
shorter throughput times. 
Despite the heavily increased 
competition the unit has 
kept its strong position.
Problems: The division was 
urged to defend its role as 
market leader. Change from 
a stable market into a 
demanding turbulent market. 
Effects: Higher productivity, 
higher service quality, 
reduction of managerial 
staff. Higher profits.
izational renewal and information systems design (den Hertog & Wester, 
1979; den Hertog & Wielinga, 1992) shows that participative design makes 
no sense when the basic structural conditions for change in the workplace 
(i.e., an integral redesign) have not been fulfilled.
This brings us to the third lesson: the expert or design approach can 
be combined with the participative approach, if the change process is char­
acterized as an educational program. The members of the organization 
have to learn how to redesign their own organization themselves. The re­
design process demands a long involvement of many members of the or-
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ganization. The basic structures of production and control are at stake. This 
means that the experience and knowledge of a broad range of disciplines 
and functions have to be involved: managers, product and process design­
ers, planners, quality officers, supervisors, personnel officers, and operators. 
Most of them can oversee only a part or an aspect of the production system. 
They have been trained and conditioned in their careers to do so. They 
lack, in most organizations, the insight into interrelations, for example, be­
tween product quality and the quality of work, or between the production 
structure and logistics and deliveiy times. Besides, most of them speak only 
their own professional language. Out of these observations, the idea arose 
to compose a carefully tuned and integrated set of training courses which 
sustain and follow the course of the redesign process, enabling the members 
of the firm to understand the structural background of their problems and 
to redesign their organization themselves. An important aspect of this train­
ing process is that employees with different backgrounds acquire a common 
language to discuss organizational issues.
DISCUSSION
The approach of organizational renewal sketched out above raises 
some important theoretical as well as practical issues, all of which center 
around the notion of design. In this section, we will first discuss the place 
of a design theory like IOR in the social processes shaping organizations. 
We will then consider the general status of design approaches in the or­
ganizational sciences. We will finish with a brief discussion of IOR in re­
lation to other modern approaches of organizational design.
Design Theoiy and Social Processes
Over the past decade, the application of formal design logics has been 
heavily criticized, even in the case of computer systems design (Winograd 
& Flores, 1986; Ehn, 1988). Referring to Simon (1969, p. 54), who says 
that “everybody designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing 
existing conditions into preferred ones,” Ehn (1988) argues cogently that 
design is a social process in which two questions are crucial:
• What is the preferred situation?
• Preferred by whom?
Ehn criticizes Simon’s view on organization design as the design of the 
artificial, arguing that the shaping of an organization is a social process 
involving human beings who may be prone to pursue sectional interests or 
to defend threatened identities and statuses. Is this criticism not also ap-
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plicable to IOR, which also appears to take a very rational and even en­
gineering kind of approach? In fact, the two questions put forward by Ehn 
are also useful to explain the role of IOR design theory in processes of 
organizational change and renewal.
What is the Preferred Situation? IOR offers the members of an organi­
zation a package of empty black boxes. The challenge for them is to define 
themselves:
• the content of the boxes, or the division of labor;
• the relationships between the boxes, or the control system; and
• the norms and values that prevail in the creation of the preferred 
situation.
This means that the members of the organization are being equipped with 
language tools, which enable them to develop their own local organizational 
theory (Gustavsen, 1996). This might seem like a paradox: the use of meta­
concepts of a general nature in order to arrive at local solutions. However, 
one has to recognize that systemwide participatory change in complex or­
ganizations is in fact always a paradoxical process in which general and 
local knowledge as well as various interest positions (sometimes related to 
these knowledges) have to be mobilized.
Preferred by Whom? Essential in the IOR approach is the consensus 
within the organization about the tasks, roles, and responsibilities in the 
redesign process itself. Reaching this consensus is in fact the most critical 
step in each project. Obviously, consensus is by no means always natural 
or self-evident in enterprises. Consensus around redesign of an organization 
does not deny that there is bound to be a lack of consensus concerning 
many other issues, nor does it exclude conflicts of interest, which will turn 
up time and again during implementation processes. In some organizations, 
basic consensus can be achieved very early. They choose IOR and not some 
form of Business Process Re-engineering, because they agree on a partici­
patory approach. In the preliminary phase of the project in the Dutch in­
surance company Nationale Nederlanden (den Hertog, 1995), members of 
the works council interviewed colleagues in other firms, who had gone 
through an IOR-process. On the basis of the information received, they 
decided to give a positive advice for IOR at Nationale Nederlanden, be­
cause the participatory potential of IOR seemed to them larger than that 
of other options. In other cases, however, it took considerably more time 
to reach this agreement. In still other cases, the process broke down half 
way, because of the lack of trust between the players involved. In most of 
such cases, it is not top management or the shop floor workers who are 
throwing up roadblocks, but the staff departments, which are defending 
their positions of power in the organization.
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This means that IOR does not offer a guarantee for a successful par­
ticipatory design. As in any other participatory scheme, concepts, proce­
dures, and rules can be misused, for instance, to consolidate the status quo. 
However, IOR forces all players to make their choices explicit, not only 
choices about the “preferred situation,” but also about the way the pre­
ferred situation is to be reached. Obviously, concepts can be misused and 
procedures can be misinterpreted. Managers can talk in a participative way, 
while acting in an opposite manner. Redesign processes can be undone by 
mergers and takeovers, or the firm can run out of resources. All these 
things happen, as in any other major organizational change program. Con­
ceptual schemes are in this respect not more than tools for change. The 
learning remains in the doing.
Design Theory and Design-Oriented Research
Organization science is not only a descriptive and explanatory science 
but also a design discipline. Simon (1969) went even further by arguing 
that the ultimate orientation of disciplines like medicine and business ad­
ministration is design. Simon found that this ultimate design orientation is 
seldom discussed in the mainstream of research and education in these 
disciplines. In order to be accepted, the design-oriented disciplines had to 
concentrate on description and explanation in order to acquire a scientific 
appearance. The real design issues were neglected, in Simon’s view, because 
design was considered as being “intellectually soft, intuitive and cookbooky” 
(Simon, 1969, p. 57). A predominantly European stream of researchers has 
followed the track of Simon in propagating design-oriented research (cf.
den Hertog, 1994; Ehn, 1988; Hopwood, 1983; Oehlke, 1993; Voss, 1988). 
IOR is part of that stream. Design-oriented research is concerned with in­
vestigating:
• the problems that cause firms to redesign structures and processes;
• design alternatives and methods of comparing them;
• the process of design: strategies, methods, and power relations; and
• the impacts of implementation.
Design-oriented research still has a long way to go, Managers are interested 
in off-the-shelf knowledge and tools, which organization science is only be­
ginning to produce. For the time being, design theory will often be too 
esoteric for the practitioner and “too intuitive and cookbooky” for the edi­
tors of scientific journals. That also applies for the IOR-approach devel­
oped in the Netherlands. Only in the last 5 years have efforts begun to 
create a better scientific infrastructure at universities that allows for a criti­
cal analysis and description of redesign projects. The stream of empirical
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studies has grown as a result (for example, Roberts, 1993; Hoevenaars, 
1991; van Ewijk-Hoevenaars et al., 1995; Fruytier, 1994; Haak, 1994; den 
Hertog, 1995; Peters, 1995; van der Zwaan, 1994). The Dutch Ministries 
of Social Affairs, Education and Science, and Economic Affairs have con­
tributed to a research program for this purpose.
Bridging the gap between organization science and design practice raises 
numerous methodological questions. One of the basic questions is the ques­
tion of validation and testing. Organizational renewal programs as described 
above, are far more complex than can be deduced from a limited set of design 
concepts, design rules, and design sequences. In practice, they are composed 
of complex chains of discoveries, decisions, and actions (cf. Stacey, 1996), 
involving in each case dozens or hundreds of actors. Furthermore, each situ­
ation in which these concepts and rules are applied has its own unique fea­
tures. That makes it hard to make a judgment about the validity of a design 
theory. There are always other factors which could explain the success or 
failure of a renewal process, apart from the ones taken into account by the 
design theory. Apart from the study of carefully collected case material, final 
judgment will always also be based on practical success. The problem is of 
course how to measure the latter. It becomes visible in at least two ways: in 
the interest shown by managements for a specific approach relative to other 
approaches and in the level of satisfaction shown by managements who have 
followed a specific approach. Concerning the first, we note that more and 
more managers appear disappointed in the application of business re-engi­
neering approaches based on a purely technical rationality. Recently, the 
management of a large Dutch foods manufacturer came to the conclusion 
that the streamlining of the production system does require involvement and 
commitment throughout the organization. This led to the decision to stop an 
ongoing re-engineering process and to make a new start along the sociotech- 
nical lines sketched above. Concerning the second, there needs to be evi­
dence that the design works in practice. Managers are not as easily convinced 
as in the past by glossy presentations of consultants or guidelines from cor­
porate headquarters. Managers do not decide to start sociotechnical redesign 
processes when they have not convinced themselves of the feasibility of the 
approach in other organizations. They have to see with their own eyes that 
the approach relates to their perception of their organizational problems and 
can be effectively put into practice. Works councils tend to act in the same 
way. Active involvement of works councils is important to create the right 
conditions for change. This involvement goes beyond the formal goal setting 
and planning of a change project. Early involvement in the selection of the 
right consultancy agency is one way to develop trustful relations between 
managers, worker representatives, and change agents. For example, the 
works council of the insurance company Nationale Nederlanden visited four
528 de Sitter, den Hertog, and Dankbaar
other firms which were engaged in IOR before giving their approval to the 
redesign program proposed by management. The growing number of practi­
cal examples in well-respected firms has gradually contributed to the percep­
tion of IOR as a realistic organizational option. However, this cannot be 
considered proof of the superiority or even the validity of the IOR approach. 
The majority of Dutch firms is still opting for other strategies, be they cultural 
change programs or IT-dominated re-engineering programs.
Besides this general need for consolidation and codification, the Dutch 
IOR-approach is also facing another challenge. Up until now, IOR has de­
veloped as a local or rather as a regional theory. Although there are parallel 
developments in other European countries, IOR has not evolved within 
the framework of an international scientific forum. This local or maybe 
even provincial approach of redesign is a problem for most European ap­
proaches. It is, for instance, remarkable that very little of the massive re­
search on work organization in Germany has ever penetrated the English 
literature (cf. Altmann et al., 1992). A very positive development in this 
respect is the slow but steady growth of a design-oriented scientific com­
munity across national and disciplinary borders (Pornschlegel, 1993). Fur­
thermore, in the last few years, some efforts have been undertaken to make 
a connection between the European design tradition and concepts in the 
Anglo-Saxon management literature (for example, Frackmann & Lehnkuhl,
1993; RKW, 1992; Dankbaar, 1993).
IOR and Other Design Approaches
On several occasions, we have noted above that there are some obvious 
parallels between IOR and other design-oriented approaches like Business 
Process Reengineering and to a lesser extent Lean Production. Tbgether 
with the observation that IOR has developed in relative isolation, this raises 
the question whether these and other European sociotechnical approaches 
can be considered as European counterparts and indeed as functional 
equivalents of approaches developed in Japan and the United States. A 
complete answer to that question cannot be given here. There is a lack of 
evaluation research in this field, lb  date, there is an urgent need for studies 
which not only focus on the effects but also analyze the process of design 
and development. This makes it difficult to compare the changes as they 
are actually implemented in practice. We hope to have shown that IOR 
offers opportunities to base organizational (re)design on sound theoretical 
understanding and systematic, theory-driven analysis of organizational 
problems. Furthermore, IOR attempts to link the design process to the 
development process. We would argue that IOR is stronger in this respect 
than either BPR or Lean Production and therefore provides a better link
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to the organizational sciences. BPR is at its best where it combines a focus 
on the simplification of the primary process of the enterprise with a vision­
ary understanding of the opportunities and options created by the new in­
formation and communication technologies. Clearly, such understanding 
could enhance the value of the awareness raising and strategic orientation 
steps of the redesign process. However, if they are not combined with a 
solid design and a proven development strategy, the results may be less 
spectacular than the visions. BPR does not appear to offer clear guidelines 
for the simplification of the primary process. It does not appear to have a 
view on the quality of labor remaining after automation and it is doubtful 
that implementation is more than the exercise of hierarchical power. Such 
statements remain tentative, however, as long as the empirical basis for 
comparison of different approaches is still lacking. In this respect, the need 
for design-oriented field research is underlined again, research on what the 
pioneers of sociotechnical theory have called “organizational choice” (Trist 
et al, 1963). Lean Production, on the other hand, is not really a design- 
oriented approach, but a more or less coherent set of practices, which has 
emerged in the Japanese automobile industry over the past 40 years. It has 
not much to offer in terms of a design theory or an IT vision, but it does 
offer important insights in the still powerful effects of the methodical im­
plementation and especially the continuous fine-tuning of mostly very tra­
ditional organizational designs.
IOR cannot pretend to have answers to all the questions and issues 
which have given rise to Lean Production and BPR. IOR is concentrated on 
actions to improve the flexibility of organizations faced by an increasingly 
complex environment. It is better at that than at continuous improvement or 
IT-driven redesign. It does offer theoretical insights and building blocks for 
the further development of a design theoiy, which is needed by all.
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APPENDIX A
Coping with External Contingencies by Investing in Extra Staff
A new staff member is introduced in a chemical production plant: the 
environmental official. As a first assignment, she is charged with the task 
of writing a strategic environmental plan and adjusting the existing proce­
dures to current demands. In doing so, she must make an attempt to adapt
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these procedures and systems to the other systems and procedures that are
used within the firm.
During the first week she meets all managers of the first and second
echelons. Every manager conveys a separate message to her. The marketing 
manager points to the importance of the firm’s image to the outside. The 
product developer wants more space for the development of environment- 
friendly products. The process technologist points out the need for new 
investments in basic processes. The production manager, finally, makes 
clear that he is very positive toward the environment, as long as he is not 
once again stuck with a whole new set of formal rules.
Then follow the staff members down the hall. In the first room is the 
safety expert, who proudly points at the row of handbooks containing rules 
and procedures. The safety expert has acquired a fixed position. The quality 
man next door is in a more difficult position. He has a similar row of stand­
ards and procedures, but qualify is not “alive in the plant.” At this moment, 
he works together with a business economist of a consultancy bureau to quan­
tify the quality proceeds and costs. Perhaps that is the way to convince peo­
ple. He cooperates with the automation department in order to achieve a 
better link of process data and economic data. In the room next to her own 
is the labor expert, who has only just arrived himself. He has a good rela­
tionship with the quality man. Formal procedures and information systems 
are needed to keep control of the process. But more must be done: “the 
culture must be reversed.” In fact, what should be started is a training tra­
jectory. They’d have to talk about that with the central training department.
APPENDIX B
Even Small Firms Can Suddenly Become Too Complex to Manage
Even small and medium-sized firms can be “strangled” by a sudden 
increase in internal complexity. That is exactly what happened at Zilverstad, 
a Dutch family-owned producer of premiums and corporate gifts, jewelry, 
and souvenirs (Roberts, 1993). Like many other silversmithing companies 
in the Netherlands in the late eighties, this firm, which employs about 70 
people, faced severe competition from Asian countries. During that period, 
the Dutch turnover in this sector of industry diminished yearly about 15%. 
The two brothers who owned and managed the company had to find a 
new strategy to counter this development. They decided to change their 
product/market portfolio: more emphasis on customized high-quality prod­
ucts produced in small batches and more effort to enter the German mar­
ket. This strategy proved to be successful even in the short term. Zilverstad 
managed to grow while the Dutch share of the market was declining. How-
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ever, the price to be paid for this change was high. The complexity of the 
interrelations within the organization increased very rapidly. The primary 
process was running out of control. As the production executive stated 
(Roberts, 1993, p. 97): “. . . orders came into the factory and, at some 
time, came out again but what happened in between we didn’t know. In 
the factory everything was milling about, and there were bottlenecks in 
manufacturing. This was mainly caused by our own pre-occupation with 
special customer orders, and therefore, with new and unknown products 
with all the quality and planning problems that went with it.” The causes 
of the problem and possible remedies were recognized by the two owners 
during an introductory course on sociotechnical design organized by the 
Dutch Federation for small metal working firms. The brothers decided to 
start a sociotechnical redesign program in their firm. As a first step, a “deep 
slice” of employees participated in the design course. This group worked 
out a new set-up for the organization. The key of the new design was the 
breakdown of the functional organization (“functional deconcentration”). 
The primary process (or “the production structure”) was organized in four 
parallel self-managing teams (“parallelization”) on the basis of production 
and product characteristics. The configuration of indirect or control tasks 
(the “control structure”) followed the redesign of the production flow. As 
much as possible, indirect tasks (or “control tasks” such as incoming in­
spection, job scheduling, and calculation) were allocated to these teams. 
The new control structure was supported by the introduction of IT systems. 
Due to this change, it was possible to reduce the number of interrelations 
within the firm and, thus, the complexity of the organization. Less than 18 
months later, the economical effects became evident: delivery reliability 
went up from 40 to 85%, delivery times were reduced by 20%, and pro­
ductivity improved by 20%.
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